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 <title>IP Convergence: Beyond VoIP, Beyond Cost Savings - CALEA, Regulatory, FCC</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/taxonomy/term/30 24 17/0</link>
 <description></description>
 <language>en</language>
<item>
 <title>6 years later...</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/412</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;In a &lt;a href="http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/common/opinions/200807/07-1446-1126053.pdf" title="reference on decision" target="_blank"&gt;decision&lt;/a&gt; released July 8, 2008, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia issued a Writ of Mandamus compelling the FCC to finally provide the legal justification for a decision it made 6 YEARS AGO concerning reciprocal compensation for traffic destined to ISPs.&lt;br /&gt;
The fact that it took the court so long to take this action is testimony to one of the biggest problems plaguing the telecommunications industry today  - process paralysis.  The matter at issue is actually one that dates back more than 10 years.  During the 1990s, when CLECs succeeded in besting the Bell  Companies at their own game of access charges and began collecting enormous sums of revenue for traffic destined to Internet Service Providers, the Bell Companies asked the FCC to eliminate compensation for ISP-bound traffic (rather than compete for the ISP business directly).  On February 26, 1999 the FCC released a &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6006644392" title="reference on Declaratory Ruling" target="_blank"&gt;Declaratory Ruling&lt;/a&gt;, which concluded that ISP-bound traffic was "jurisdictionally mixed and largely interstate, and the reciprocal compensation obligations do not apply to this traffic."  In March 2000, the District Court vacated and remanded the FCC’s decision for lack of adequate justification.  In 2001, the FCC issued a further &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6512566754" title="reference on decision" target="_blank"&gt;decision&lt;/a&gt; attempting once again to provide legal justification for its 1999 decision and establishing a new compensation regime for ISP-bound traffic.&lt;br /&gt;
In May 2002, the District Court remanded the FCC’s decision a second time, but this time without vacating the decision because as the District Court stated, “we thought there was a ‘non-trivial likelihood’ the Commission would be able to state a valid legal basis for its rule.”  In issuing the Writ of Mandamus this week, the District Court dismissed the FCC’s continued assurances that it would act by November 5, 2008 on the issue.  So basically 9 YEARS AFTER robbing CLECs of inter-carrier compensation with no apparent legal justification, the FCC’s defense was still “trust us, we’ll address the issue.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This episode, as much as any other, highlights the criticality of reform for the regulatory decision-making process.  The issue started as a contract dispute between CLECs and the Bell Companies that in normal commercial practices would have been negotiated out or put before a commercial arbitrator in a matter of weeks or months.  But because the Bell Companies invoked the regulatory process they were able to use their political, legal, and regulatory resources to achieve what they would otherwise not have been able to achieve at the bargaining table and drag this process out for 9 years.  Worse still, the Bell Companies achieved this victory with no apparent legal basis.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What a different industry it might have been if the FCC refused to take up the dispute and forced the Bell Companies to either live with the bargain they struck or negotiate a new one.  The CLEC industry would have been flush with cash to fund their network expansion.  The Bell Companies would have been forced to develop more competitive services for ISPs.  Who knows what the impact would have been on mergers and acquisitions.  Unfortunately, there are multiple examples like the ISP-bound traffic issue that if the FCC had handled differently would have been of enormous benefit to the broader telecommunications industry.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Well, the FCC does have one more opportunity to not only address compensation for ISP-bound traffic, but all traffic.  In its May &lt;a href="http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-122A1.pdf" title="reference on decision" target="_blank"&gt;decision&lt;/a&gt; capping universal service support, the FCC &lt;a href="http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281939A1.pdf" title="reference on stated" target="_blank"&gt;stated&lt;/a&gt; it intended to address comprehensive inter-carrier compensation and in subsequent statements set a target date of November 5, 2008.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Let’s hope that after 9 years the FCC can finally figure this out because the telecommunications industry in the United States is severely handicapped relative to its overseas counterparts by an anachronistic inter-carrier compensation regime that burdens the industry with endless litigation and exorbitant costs.  Hopefully come November we won’t still be scratching our heads wondering what it is the FCC has done to this industry.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Fri, 11 Jul 2008 13:38:00 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Finally policy makers are focusing on rights of way</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/410</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;A new &lt;a href="http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/11/40761101.pdf" title="reference on paper" target="_blank"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; from the Organization for Economic Development &lt;a href="http://www.oecd.org/home/0,2987,en_2649_201185_1_1_1_1_1,00.html" title="reference on (”OECD”)" target="_blank"&gt;(”OECD”)&lt;/a&gt; recognizes the importance of rights of way to sustainable competition for next generation networks.   Some note worthy quotes include: &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“The limitations faced by new entrants are significant, especially with respect to the reach of their existing networks and their ability to obtain access to rights of way and ducts. It is thus difficult for new entrants to replicate an NGN access infrastructure.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“In addition, a large percentage of costs in rolling out new fibre networks are construction costs related to conduits and rights of way. Construction costs could be significantly higher for operators if they do not already have access to rights of way and ducts.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“Incumbents have a significant advantage because their historical monopoly position has given them existing rights of way and they usually own the ducts used by copper networks (which often means they do not pay for rights of way).  Other utilities, such as electric power companies, also have access to rights of way and ducts. The number of administrative layers (local municipal councils, regional bodies, etc.) often creates difficulties for new entrants in obtaining access to rights of way and ducts. Where municipalities are pro-active in trying to ensure that fibre networks are developed, they often provide access to municipal rights of way and ducts on reasonable terms.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The OECD goes on to recommend &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;“The high costs of civil works to construct ducts will impact on new entrants who, in contrast to incumbents, do not have historical access to rights of way and ducts. In order to try and stimulate the rollout of fibre by new entrants it is important for policy makers and communication regulators to examine steps that can be taken to reduce these costs. There are a number of steps that can facilitate new entrants including:&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Reducing barriers associated with obtaining municipal authorisation for access to and use of rights of way.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Ensuring clarification of jurisdiction for both granting rights of way and settling disputes and coordination among the public authorities involved.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Harmonising administrative procedures for access to rights of way and ensuring consistency in the application of these procedures across a country.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Reducing or eliminating any fees associated with using rights of way.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Ensuring that operators investing in ducts are subject to a minimum set of obligations for remediation and maintenance.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Encouraging and/or obliging sharing of ducts and other rights of way both by incumbent communication companies, but also by other municipal utilities that have infrastructure.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Examining the role of public-private partnerships in the deployment of dark fibre and/or third party infrastructure providers for duct sharing.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Examining the possibility of regulatory measures to impose the pre-wiring of new residences for sharing of in-house wiring.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Developing policies to construct joint ducts by new entrants.&lt;br /&gt;
         •	Adding inner ducts (duct dividers) into the ducts and canals for increasing the existing capacity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Delays in rolling out networks can be costly for operators, and can delay the development of competitive markets, so that by preventing delays in the process of rights of way applications, a system of safeguards which ensures that deadlines for decisions concerning permits are respected. Establishing targeted time frames for various steps of the rights of way process helps in providing predictability to the applicant. In order to facilitate competing fibre local loops, reduce costs and reduce multiple excavation and other civil works in municipalities the sharing of existing ducts, both of telecommunication and cable companies, but also of other utilities, is an important policy requirement. Similarly access to buildings and sharing of wiring is important to ensure effective competition in the market.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;One can only hope that policy makers actually read this paper and take action on its recommendation.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Thu, 19 Jun 2008 01:46:49 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Glass Houses</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/408</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;I had the opportunity to speak Friday at a &lt;a href="http://www.etmforums.com/program.htm" title="reference on conference" target="_blank"&gt;conference&lt;/a&gt; hosted by the law firm of Paul Hastings, Janofsky &amp;amp; Walker, LLP.  The focus of the conference was emerging markets and the countries Brazil, Russia, India and China (“BRIC” countries).  I enjoy small conferences like this because you get a freer exchange of ideas than some of the bigger conferences.  The panel I was on concerned legal and regulatory entry barriers in the BRIC countries.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Because there was a representative from the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Trade Representative’s  (“USTR”) offices, I felt compelled to point out how the United States’ own policies compare to those of the BRIC countries.  So, I noted that the U.S. maintains foreign ownership restrictions like China and India do (Russia and Brazil do not).  I noted that Brazil only charges a 1.5%  tax for universal service whereas the United States charges 10%.  I noted that the United States imposes unique obligations on foreign-owned and operated carriers like India does.   And I noted that many of the problems that plague regulators in India, Brazil and China plague the FCC as well.  The uncertainty and inconsistency of decision-making is not unique to the BRIC countries.  The fact that the FCC has sat on inter-carrier compensation reform for over five years is testimony to that.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The job of the State Department and USTR is made all the harder by the fact that the United States practices much of what it preaches against overseas.  Those who live in glass houses…&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2008 18:10:41 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>An Information Gap in the Digital Universe</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/399</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The release of &lt;a href="http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/diverse-exploding-digital-universe.pdf" title="reference on ”The Diverse and Exploding Digital Universe”" target="_blank"&gt;”The Diverse and Exploding Digital Universe”&lt;/a&gt;, a report produced by &lt;a href="http://www.idc.com/" title="reference on IDC" target="_blank"&gt;IDC&lt;/a&gt; and sponsored by &lt;a href="http://www.emc.com/utilities/globalsiteselect.jhtml?checked=true" title="reference on EMC" target="_blank"&gt;EMC&lt;/a&gt;, is fascinating on several levels.  First, the fact that someone is trying to quantify the digital universe is an interesting and welcome exercise.  Second, the extent to which the size of the digital universe is consumer generated is gratifying.  Third, the extent to which enterprises exercise control over digital content is disconcerting.  Fourth, the growth of your “digital shadow” as IDC calls it is more than disconcerting.  And fifth, you realize after reading the report that we have not developed any coherent public policy to govern the digital universe.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To the first point, putting aside the obvious self interest EMC has in publicizing the extent of digital storage, it is a very useful exercise to capture the growth of the digital universe.  Information is the key to successful management and studies such as these add to our understanding of the broader trends and dynamics taking place in the digital universe.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The second point and third points are in reaction to this statement in particular – &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;            "While 70% or more of the digital universe is created,&lt;br /&gt;
            captured, or replicated by individuals — consumers and&lt;br /&gt;
            desk and information workers toiling far away from the&lt;br /&gt;
            datacenter — enterprises, at some point in time, have&lt;br /&gt;
            responsibility or liability for 85%."&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It is great to see that individuals are the primary generators of digital content and that the production of digital content is not concentrated in the hands of the few.  This makes sense since the tools required to generate digital content are much more democratic than the tools of the last century.  Today someone with a computer, web camera and an iPod can create halfway decent content.  Add in an actual video camera and some editing and mixing software and you can pretty much create high-quality content that used to require full-blown production studios.  Now you can simply upload that content to the Internet whereas in the past you had to either be a broadcaster, publisher or movie distributor.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The scary part is that 85% of that content falls under the control of enterprises at some point.  While for the most part these enterprises have refrained from exerting control over the content there have been &lt;a href="http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20070927-verizon-censoring-unsavory-political-group-sms-messaging.html" title="reference on cases" target="_blank"&gt;cases&lt;/a&gt; where they have tried.  The good news is those attempts largely failed.  The bad news is they only failed because they became public and public opinion was quickly marshaled against the efforts.  That is not a sustainable process in the long term and soon enough the public is going to grow tired of these spontaneous crusades.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Where things start to get scary is the notion of a “digital shadow”.  As defined in the IDC report, your digital shadow consists of “digital images of you on a surveillance camera and records in banking, brokerage, retail, airline, telephone, and medical databases. It is information about Web searches and general backup data. It is copies of hospital scans. In other words, it is information about you in cyberspace. Your digital shadow, if you will.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;IDC estimates that your digital shadow comprises roughly half of your digital footprint.  In other words, half of your digital footprint consists of content you created and half consists of information about you that is collected from a multitude of sources.  It is this latter aspect, and particularly the ability to aggregate that information, that really scares me whether such aggregation is performed by enterprises or government.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which brings me to my last point.  There is no coherent public policy governing the generation, transfer, use, and disposal of digital information.  European regulators have made some attempts in this area, most notably with the &lt;a href="http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/privacy/law/index_en.htm" title="reference on Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data" target="_blank"&gt;Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of personal data&lt;/a&gt; as well as &lt;a href="http://www.ispai.ie/DR%20as%20published%20OJ%2013-04-06.pdf" title="reference on Directive 2006/24/EC" target="_blank"&gt;Directive 2006/24/EC&lt;/a&gt; on the “retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC.”  Nothing comparable exists in the U.S. unless you count the &lt;a href="http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm" title="reference on disclosure statutes" target="_blank"&gt;disclosure statutes&lt;/a&gt; of numerous states.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What concerns me is that the approach of the U.S. government is to encourage enterprises to establish their own policies that they will enforce through the control they exert over 85% of the consumer-generated content.  These policies will serve the enterprises well and give them access to a treasure-trove of personal information that they can do with largely as they please especially if they share it with law enforcement.   This Administration’s efforts to collect &lt;a href="http://online.wsj.com/article_print/SB120511973377523845.html" title="reference on calling data" target="_blank"&gt;calling data&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/money/article/0,2777,DRMN_23908_4789925,00.html" title="reference on credit card" target="_blank"&gt;credit card&lt;/a&gt; data attest to that.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But what about consumers?  Don’t they have a right to this information?  Indeed, don’t they have a property right in their information?  In the United States we allow citizens to kill an intruder in our home.  Shouldn’t we have some equivalent right (albeit less severe) for intruders into our digital “home”?  What we are seeing develop is an information gap between what enterprises know about their customers versus what customers know about enterprises.  A similar gap is widening between what the government knows about you and you about your government.  That gap has to be closed and the quickest and most complete way to do that is to acknowledge the property interest that individuals have in their digital information.  Once acknowledged, we can then begin to apply traditional property law and policies and close the information gap that is widening all too fast.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Wed, 19 Mar 2008 20:38:54 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Taking Credit Where None is Due</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/395</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;With the release of &lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2008/NetworkedNationBroadbandinAmerica2007.pdf" title="  Broadband in America 2007”" target="_blank"&gt;”Networked Nation:  Broadband in America 2007”&lt;/a&gt;, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration &lt;a href="http://www.ntia.doc.gov/" title="reference on (“NTIA”)" target="_blank"&gt;(“NTIA”)&lt;/a&gt; takes credit for largely achieving President Bush’s 2004 &lt;a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/technology/economic_policy200404/chap4.html" title="reference on goal" target="_blank"&gt;goal&lt;/a&gt; of “universal, affordable broadband access for all Americans.”  Not to be too cynical, but NTIA’s claim is akin to Hank Morgan’s claim that he caused the solar eclipse in Mark Twain’s &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/A_Connecticut_Yankee_in_King_Arthur&amp;#039;s_Court" title="reference on A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court." target="_blank"&gt;A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur’s Court.&lt;/a&gt;  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;First, the methodology by which NTIA reaches its conclusion is spurious at best.  But I shouldn’t be too harsh on NTIA since they are simply following the FCC’s methods.  You see, NTIA makes it claim because “broadband service was available in 99 percent of the nation’s zip codes, encompassing 99 percent of the nation’s population.”  If one person in a zip code has broadband service, the FCC counts the entire zip code as having broadband access.  So by this methodology it isn’t too hard to claim success.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Second, increased broadband penetration was inevitable and would have occurred regardless of public policy.  Broadband penetration occurred at a rate that surpassed all previous consumer electronics.  In a September 2007 survey, &lt;a href="http://www.pewinternet.org/" title="reference on Pew Internet" target="_blank"&gt;Pew Internet&lt;/a&gt; found that broadband was adopted by a majority of consumers faster than other technologies. Broadband took 10 years to break 50% adoption, followed by the CD Player at 10.5 years, the VCR at 14 years, cell phones took 15 years, color TVs took 18 years, as did the personal computer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So was this adoption due to Administration policy or because consumers know a good thing when they see one?  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Third, this Administration considers bandwidth speeds of 200 kbs to constitute “broadband.”  200 kbs may be “Rubenesque” among narrowband speeds, but it hardly counts as broadband, especially when you consider the speeds available around the &lt;a href="http://www.oecd.org/document/54/0,3343,en_2649_33703_38690102_1_1_1_1,00.html" title="reference on world." target="_blank"&gt;world.&lt;/a&gt;  And when you look at actual speeds that U.S. consumers enjoy, the picture is even grimmer.  The Communications Workers of America (an obviously self-interested source) produced a &lt;a href="http://www.speedmatters.org/document-library/sourcematerials/sm_report.pdf" title="reference on report" target="_blank"&gt;report&lt;/a&gt; last year showing the median download speed in the United States is 1.9 Mbps, compared with 61 Mbps in Japan, 45 Mbps in South Korea, 21 Mbps in Finland,  18 Mbps in Sweden, and 7.6 Mbps in Canada.   And of course U.S. consumers pay far more per megabit than residents in these other countries.  According to the OECD, the average price per advertised Mbit/s of connectivity in the OECD is USD $18. Japan, France, Sweden, Korea and Finland have the least expensive offers per Mbit/s&lt;br /&gt;
        o Japan: USD $0.13&lt;br /&gt;
        o France : USD $0.33&lt;br /&gt;
        o Sweden: USD $0.35&lt;br /&gt;
        o Korea: USD $0.38&lt;br /&gt;
        o Finland: USD $0.42&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So what exactly is there for this Administration to take credit for?  Did their policies stimulate broadband penetration, increase broadband speeds, and reduce broadband prices or like Hank Morgan are they simply taking credit for a phenomenon that was already happening over which they had no influence?&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Fri, 15 Feb 2008 15:49:12 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Interconnection and National Security</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/393</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The former company I worked for had a saying: “Don’t put all of your telecom eggs in one basket.”  It was brilliant in its simplicity, but it captured a very complex and very real problem that businesses at the time faced.  Fresh off the fallout of the fire in Illinois Bell’s  &lt;a href="http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=940DE7D91F3AF935A15756C0A96E948260&amp;amp;sec=&amp;amp;spon=&amp;amp;pagewanted=all" title="reference on Hinsdale" target="_blank"&gt;Hinsdale&lt;/a&gt; switching center, companies realized that they were incredibly dependent on their telecommunications networks and that disruption to “the” network would have a catastrophic impact on their business.  So companies like &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Teleport_Communications_Group" title="reference on Teleport Communications Group" target="_blank"&gt;Teleport Communications Group&lt;/a&gt; (“TCG”) quickly capitalized on needs of large businesses for diversity and became “the other local phone company.”  Smart businesses purchased services from both the incumbent Bell Company and TCG so that in the event either network experienced a service interruption, the other was available.   This was known as “operational security.”&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;You would think that in the twenty years since Hinsdale operational security would be a fact of life.  But as the &lt;a href="http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/01/internet.outage/?iref=hpmostpop" title="reference on reports" target="_blank"&gt;reports&lt;/a&gt; of the interruption of major undersea cables serving Egypt, India and Gulf Arab countries shows, governments may not have fully grasped this.   Many governments are content to continue to rely on their incumbent monopoly for their critical telecommunications needs, oblivious to the consequences of placing all of their telecom eggs in one basket until that basket gets knocked over as it did the other day.   &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;To be fair, some of the carriers impacted by the cable cuts did have diverse routes available so service was not cut off completely.  But the incidents highlight the need for governments to examine their interconnection policies from a national security and economic security perspective as much as from a telecommunications policy perspective.  Security 101 teaches you that you should always have a backup.  In the telecommunications world, multiple networks are most valuable the more they are interconnected.  An interconnected “network of networks” is highly robust and able to withstand all but the most catastrophic events that impact a wide geography (e.g., tsunami, nuclear attack, etc.).  The more interconnected networks are, the greater their robustness.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So when policy makers hear the arguments from incumbent carriers that they shouldn’t be forced to interconnect, or they should be able to charge “market” rates for interconnection, policy makers need to remind them that they are operating critical infrastructure and that interconnection is critical to national and economic security.  When viewed in this light, interconnection is more than just a negotiation point between two large commercial enterprises.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Mon, 04 Feb 2008 14:35:48 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>A Full Agenda</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/391</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;2008 holds the potential to be a landmark year for telecommunications regulation – if the FCC is willing to take action on the issues before it.  A quick look shows the FCC has a lot on its plate.  There are the long-standing issues of &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6512566752" title="reference on inter-carrier compensation" target="_blank"&gt;inter-carrier compensation&lt;/a&gt; (yes this docket was initiated in April 2001 and there is still no resolution to it) and &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6513382414" title="reference on special access reform" target="_blank"&gt;special access reform&lt;/a&gt; (yes this docket was initiated in October 2002 and there is still no resolution to it either).  Both of these issues take on a new urgency with the competing Petitions for Forbearance filed by &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6519811605" title="reference on Feature Group IP" target="_blank"&gt;Feature Group IP&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6519823033" title="reference on Embarq" target="_blank"&gt;Embarq&lt;/a&gt; regarding the application of access to charges to IP services and the coming expiration of Verizon’s &lt;a href="http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-05-184A1.pdf" title="reference on merger commitments" target="_blank"&gt;merger commitments&lt;/a&gt; on special access.  Then there are the dual petitions from &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6519811711" title="reference on Vuze" target="_blank"&gt;Vuze&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&amp;amp;id_document=6519825121" title="reference on Free Press" target="_blank"&gt;Free Press&lt;/a&gt; on traffic management and peer-to-peer traffic that the FCC just put out on public notice.  Finally, there is the Joint Board &lt;a href="http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-07J-4A1.pdf" title="reference on proposal" target="_blank"&gt;proposal&lt;/a&gt; on universal service reform (an issue that has been around since the 1913 &lt;a href="http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cjv14n2-6.html" title="reference on Kingsbury Commitment" target="_blank"&gt;Kingsbury Commitment&lt;/a&gt; and was supposed to be addressed immediately following passage of the &lt;a href="http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=104_cong_bills&amp;amp;docid=f:s652enr.txt.pdf" title="reference on Telecommunications Act of 1996" target="_blank"&gt;Telecommunications Act of 1996&lt;/a&gt;).  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;If the FCC wanted to, it could address all of these issues in 2008 and redefine the telecommunications landscape for the next several decades.  I realize that is wishful thinking and unrealistic under the best of circumstances, but at some point someone needs to recognize that the FCC regulates an industry that generates a trillion dollars in &lt;a href="http://www.plunkettresearch.com/Telecommunications/TelecommunicationsStatistics/tabid/96/Default.aspx" title="reference on economic activity" target="_blank"&gt;economic activity&lt;/a&gt;, directly &lt;a href="http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs020.htm" title="reference on employs" target="_blank"&gt;employs&lt;/a&gt; one million people, and is responsible for  deploying and operating the infrastructure that will support so much of the future global economy.  Is it too much to ask for the government to address critical policy issues impacting this industry in less than ten years?  Think of the costs of inaction to the economy.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;At a time when so many politicians are calling for “change”, a welcome change would be for the FCC to take the action this industry so urgently needs to move forward.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2008 21:36:35 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>and from the "No taps for you" department...</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/no_tap</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;This one is a beauty - on Jan. 10th of this month, the &lt;a href="http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/33624prs20080110.html" title="reference on ACLU" target="_blank"&gt;ACLU&lt;/a&gt; issued a statement that reported that a FBI wiretap was &amp;quot;unplugged&amp;quot; due to a lack of payment.&amp;nbsp; The ACLU is quick to point out that this action was taken from the same telecoms that permitted the tap without the proper approvals...&lt;br &gt;&lt;br &gt;From Michael German, ACLU National Security  Policy Counsel: &amp;quot;It seems the telecoms, who are claiming they were just  being &amp;quot;good patriots&amp;quot; when they allowed the government to spy on us without  warrants, are more than willing to pull the plug on national security  investigations when the government falls behind on its bills.&amp;quot;&lt;br &gt;&lt;img width="520" height="437" border="0" src="http://voiploser.com/misc/wiretap.jpg"&gt;&lt;br &gt;Adam &amp;quot;voiploser&amp;quot; Uzelac&lt;br &gt;DISCLAIMER: The comments here are mine only. They don't necessarily reflect intelligence, refined thoughts, or anything that the reader should take too seriously. Should the reader expect a polished thought process in the content addressed here, then a strong dose of medication should be prescribed to address that misconception.&lt;br &gt;&lt;br &gt;&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Tue, 15 Jan 2008 15:06:53 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Femtocells the Answer?</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/femtocells</link>
 <description>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Femtocells the Answer?&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;img width="640" height="480" border="0" src="http://www.citylightsguide.com/citylightsgirl/uploaded_images/cell-phone-760484.jpg"&gt;&lt;br &gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;There have been some very interesting developments in the wireless world as of late.&amp;nbsp; &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Femtocells" title="reference on Femtocells" target="_blank"&gt;Femtocells&lt;/a&gt; are basically Access Point Base Stations that permit wireless operators to extend coverage in places where &amp;ldquo;dead spots&amp;rdquo; are problematic. &amp;nbsp;This sounds like a great idea for those that have experienced the issues where a wireless phone call drops due to one moving into an area where coverage is &amp;ldquo;shady&amp;rdquo; at best &amp;ndash; for instance an elevator or a remote location in a campus or building. &amp;nbsp;But with this concept, comes some problems that need to be resolved, like E911, Lawful Intercept and other such governmental obligations.&amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp; &lt;br &gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;First note the informal poll below from www.cellcoverege.com - this is a problem the industry wants to address.&lt;br &gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;
&lt;table width="200" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="1" border="0"&gt;&lt;tr &gt;&lt;td &gt;                               &lt;strong &gt;Poll: How do DropZones Affect You?&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Annoying &amp;amp; inconvenient (36%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Cannot replace home phone (15%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Creates a safety gap (13%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Crimping social life (16%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Poor reflection on business (14%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                             &lt;tr &gt;                              &lt;td &gt; 							Other (5%)&lt;/td&gt;                           &lt;/tr&gt; 						                           &lt;/table&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Femtocells have been designed to use licensed and unlicensed wireless spectrum.&amp;nbsp; In the licensed scenarios, there are concerns around Interference with the already established towers that provide subscriber access. &amp;nbsp;There are limits to the number of adjacencies that mean special attention needs to be spent with regards to the placement of the femtocells. This concern stems from marketing such solutions direct to the consumer base, and this means a &amp;ldquo;willy nilly&amp;rdquo; approach to spectrum access for subscribers causes confusion with regards to E911 and Lawful Intercept requirements that mobile network operators much meet.&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Though femtocells are gaining momentum as an alternative, there are concerns that first need to be addressed before an expectation of widespread use can be realized.&lt;/p&gt;Adam &amp;ldquo;voiploser&amp;rdquo; Uzelac  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;DISCLAIMER: The comments here are mine only. They don&amp;rsquo;t necessarily reflect intelligence, refined thoughts, or anything that the reader should take too seriously. Should the reader expect a polished thought process in the content addressed here, then a strong dose of medication should be prescribed to address that misconception.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2008 17:30:00 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Alternative dispute resolution in Canada</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/386</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;I have long believed that the regulatory process itself has become a barrier to entry into the telecommunications market and have been a strong advocate of alternative dispute resolution processes.  So I was pleased to see the &lt;a href="http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/12/21/tech-complaints.html?ref=rss" title="reference on news" target="_blank"&gt;news&lt;/a&gt; that the Canadian Radio-Television and Telecommunications Commission (“CRTC”, the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. FCC) approved an industry-sponsored telecommunications consumer complaints agency.  The new agency is supposed to resolve disputes between customers and service providers involving unregulated services.   Critics claim the new agency is toothless and a pawn of industry, but I think it is too early to conclude that.  Let’s see how the agency performs before rushing to judgment.    &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The reason I mention this at all is because dispute resolution is the key to any successful policy and policy makers everywhere should consider alternative dispute resolution processes whenever they consider regulation or deregulation.  Policy makers in Europe required incumbent operators to include in their standard interconnection offers arbitration clauses so that carriers would not have to bring their interconnection disputes to the regulator.  Policy makers should experiment more with these tools to reduce their own backlog of case work, improve efficiency, and reduce the ability of incumbents to use the regulatory process to frustrate competitive entry.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2008 19:44:47 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Don't grease the squeaky wheel just yet</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/381</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The fallout from Comcast’s alleged traffic management &lt;a href="http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597/" title="reference on practices" target="_blank"&gt;practices&lt;/a&gt; continues with the filing of a &lt;a href="http://www.publicknowledge.org/pdf/vuze-petition-20071114.pdf" title="reference on petition" target="_blank"&gt;petition&lt;/a&gt; by &lt;a href="http://www.vuze.com/" title="reference on Vuze, Inc." target="_blank"&gt;Vuze, Inc.&lt;/a&gt;, an Internet distributor of high definition content.  This petition follows on the heels of the &lt;a href="http://www.freepress.net/docs/fp_pk_comcast_complaint.pdf" title="reference on complaint" target="_blank"&gt;complaint&lt;/a&gt; filed by a coalition of consumer groups.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Vuze petition asks the FCC to “adopt reasonable rules that would prevent the network operators from engaging in practices that discriminate against particular Internet applications, content or technologies.”  Vuze says that it does not object to “traffic management” practices, but asks the FCC to ensure that such practices meet the following conditions – &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;	1.  The network operators’ network management practices should be based on actual impact on the network, rather than targeting or disproportionately impacting specific services or technologies; &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;	2. Network management practices should be transparent and publicly disclosed, providing consumers, content providers, applications developers, and service&lt;br /&gt;
	providers greater certainty that their preferred technology and services are acceptable and not subject to interference on broadband networks; and &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;	3. Network management practices should not used as a pretext for discriminating against particular types of content or services that the network operators may view as unacceptable or potential sources of competition. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While I certainly can appreciate Vuze’s interest in establishing such rules, I again have to ask, as I have throughout this entire “net neutrality” debate, why otherwise entrepreneurial people would run to the government for help with what is essentially a problem in their distribution chain?  Who is advising these companies to seek redress before the FCC and why are they being listened to?  Even a cursory review of the FCC’s record would show that they are a terrible forum for these types of disputes.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;More broadly, why is everyone trying to invite the FCC to regulate the Internet?  Has the FCC done such a great job regulating telecommunications, cable, and broadcasting that we want them now to regulate the Internet?  Think through what jurisdiction over the Internet could encompass.  Network operators, ISPs, content providers, equipment manufacturers, software developers, hardware manufacturers, service providers, the list is endless.  By the time all is said and done, the FCC would have jurisdiction over an enormous segment of the economy.  Is this what we want?  If ever there was a sure way to retard our technological progress and innovation, this is it.  I said it before and I will say it again, the cure (FCC regulation) in this case is likely far worse than the disease (alleged discrimination).&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Parties should try working these issues out amongst themselves before asking the FCC to get involved.  No where in Vuze’s petition do they say that they tried to work it out directly with Comcast.  Perhaps if they did, they would find a mutually beneficial solution.  Perhaps not.  But that doesn’t mean “there ought to be a rule.”  As I said &lt;a href="http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/paulk/" title="reference on the other day" target="_blank"&gt;the other day&lt;/a&gt;, there are a host of relationships that need to reach equilibrium before the Internet matures.  It would be a shame to freeze some of these relationships in place just to grease the squeaky wheel.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Wed, 21 Nov 2007 23:29:35 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>European Proposals Show Continued Leadership Even if They Aren’t the Best Ideas</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/380</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;The release of the &lt;a href="http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/proposals/index_en.htm" title="reference on proposals" target="_blank"&gt;proposals&lt;/a&gt; by the European Commission for reform of the European regulatory framework for telecom firms is surely just the beginning of what is to be a major political battle within Europe.  The proposals garnering the greatest attention at the moment are the ones aimed at the forming a European-wide regulatory authority and allowing national regulators to “functionally separate” the incumbent carriers if other measures fail to introduce competition.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;On the subject of the European-wide regulatory authority, I must say I think it is a bad idea and I think the U.S. experience should serve as a vivid example of the problems with such an approach.   There was a time, back in the late 1980s and early 1990s when individual states in the United States began experimenting with liberalization of the telecommunications market.  New York and Illinois were the early pioneers in this effort.  Other states, including Maryland, Massachusetts, Florida, Michigan, California, Washington, and Connecticut, recognized that market liberalization was good for investment and local business and moved quickly to initiate rulemakings or modify their telecommunications laws to open the local telephony market to competition.  By the time the &lt;a href="http://www.fcc.gov/telecom.html" title="reference on Telecommunications Act of 1996" target="_blank"&gt;Telecommunications Act of 1996&lt;/a&gt; was passed by Congress, more than a dozen states had ended the local telephone monopoly and implemented measures to promote local exchange competition.  At least a dozen more states (including Tennessee, Georgia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Texas, and Colorado) were in the process of initiating changes to their laws and regulations as well so that basically half of the states were in the process of liberalization.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But once the Telecommunications Act of 1996 passed and the experiment in local competition was nationalized, what started as an orderly progression towards effective market liberalization quickly disintegrated into an orgy of regulatory gamesmanship and litigation.  That the Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a mistake was made clear when the FCC issued its first &lt;a href="http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1996/fcc96325.pdf_" title="reference on “local competition order”" target="_blank"&gt;“local competition order”&lt;/a&gt; – a nearly 800 page order that attempted establish comprehensive local competition rules, most of which were eventually overturned after years of litigation.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How the FCC could get it so wrong when nearly half the states were getting it right is a lesson on the dangers of centralization that the Europeans would do well to heed.  But putting aside the substantive policy problems that a central authority would have, the situation in Europe is a bad idea for the simple reason that it is going to have the effect of freezing progress, not accelerating progress towards liberalization, as parties litigate the contours of the authority of this new pan-European regulator.  National regulatory authorities hostile to the idea of a pan-European regulator will simply shut down, forcing interested parties to pursue their cause at the pan-European regulatory authority, ultimately triggering litigation by the losing party.  This process could take years to sort out during which time critical issues will remain unresolved.  Moreover, this process involves substantial legal and political cost and resources for the parties involved, which lends a decisive advantage to incumbent operators.  Most nascent competitors lack the legal and political resources necessary to effectively pursue a legal claim over the course of several years from the national regulator, up to the pan-European authority, and eventually back to the national regulator where the matter will be resolved on some form of remand.  So not only will progress be frozen pending the outcome of litigation, but the outcome is more likely to be favorable to incumbent interests since they are the only parties with the resources to see the process through to its conclusion.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;My feelings about the proposal to allow national regulatory authorities to impose functional separation on incumbent operators are much more favorable from a substantive perspective, but I still have questions about the procedure.  The proposal says national regulatory authorities can impose functional separation as a measure of “last resort” and only after receiving approval from the European Commission.  I am not sure European Commission approval is a necessary component to this and it would probably be better if the European Commission simply clarifies the authority of national regulators in this regard.  &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For the moment, these are just proposals for reform.  It remains to be seen whether the European Commission will adopt them, but it demonstrates once again that the Europeans are setting the example for the world on how to effectively liberalize telecommunications markets.  Here in the U.S., policy makers seem unable to tackle the primary obstacles to more effective competition and are devoid of any creative ideas as to how to overcome them.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Fri, 16 Nov 2007 17:02:27 +0000</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Google's Mobile Phone Alliance</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/googlealliance</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;A number of bloggers have been blogging about on Google's mobile plans for the better part of the year.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Recently I &lt;a target="_self" href="google20"&gt;blogged&amp;nbsp;&lt;/a&gt; as to how Google may be able to take their may ad revenue&amp;nbsp; business model into the mobile space.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Well today, Google made it very clear with their &lt;a target="_self" href="http://techland.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2007/11/05/googles-new-mobile-alliance/?source=yahoo_quote"&gt;mobile alliance announcements&lt;/a&gt; .&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The interesting part of the discussion revolves around Verizon. Specifically, &lt;a target="_self" href="http://www.forbes.com/technology/2007/11/02/google-phone-iphone-tech-cx_ew_1102google.html"&gt;Verizon may be in talks with google&lt;/a&gt; in joining Sprint and T-Mobile as part of Google's plans.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;But is this the &lt;a target="_self" href="googleabreak"&gt;same Verizon that sued the FCC &lt;/a&gt;after the FCC adopted Google's open access&amp;nbsp; motions?&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yes it is the same Verizon.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;It may be that Verizon needs to be involved and not get blindsided as they did when they choose not to support Apple's iPhone, and lost a tremendous branding opportunity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Or, it may be that Verizon needs to be involved to make sure it's part of the disruption as mobile business models change.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Another score for the open source business model and for the public as we should see innovation at as faster velocity.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Time will tell!&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Mon, 05 Nov 2007 20:15:41 +0000</pubDate>
</item>
<item>
 <title>Breaking up is looking more promising</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/node/371</link>
 <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci_6999133" title="reference on News" target="_blank"&gt;News&lt;/a&gt; the other week that &lt;a href="http://www.telecom.co.nz/home/0,8746,200478-1000,00.html" title="reference on Telecom New Zealand" target="_blank"&gt;Telecom New Zealand&lt;/a&gt; is being split into three divisions &amp;ndash; wholesale, retail, and network &amp;ndash; is further evidence that the folks down under are far more aggressive in their efforts to introduce competition.&amp;nbsp; The other day, I applauded Australian Communications Minister, Helen Coonan, for her public rebuke of Telstra&amp;rsquo;s bill insert blaming regulation for its market failures.&amp;nbsp; Together with New Zealand&amp;rsquo;s action, these are the strongest examples of courageous policy makers taking the necessary steps to introduce long term, sustainable competition into the telecommunications industry despite the protests of the incumbents.&amp;nbsp; &lt;br &gt;&lt;br &gt;Now we also see the European Regulatory Group issuing a &lt;a href="http://erg.eu.int/doc/whatsnew/erg_press_release_nga_and_fs.pdf" title="reference on report" target="_blank"&gt;report&lt;/a&gt; saying functional separation may be appropriate in some markets.&amp;nbsp; Also, it appears that Eircom Ltd., the incumbent telephone company in Ireland is voluntarily &lt;a href="http://www.siliconrepublic.com/news/news.nv?storyid=single9372" title="reference on proposing" target="_blank"&gt;proposing&lt;/a&gt; a wholesale/retail split of its operations. &amp;nbsp;&lt;br &gt;&lt;br &gt;In the U.S., &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bell_System_divestiture" title="reference on divestiture" target="_blank"&gt;divestiture&lt;/a&gt; was instituted by the hand of a &lt;a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Harold_H._Greene" title="reference on judge" target="_blank"&gt;judge&lt;/a&gt;.&amp;nbsp; Will history repeat itself or will U.S. incumbents learn from the past and their overseas brethren? &amp;nbsp;&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 2007 17:15:17 +0000</pubDate>
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<item>
 <title>Give Google a Break</title>
 <link>http://blogs.globalcrossing.com/googleabreak</link>
 <description>&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;This weekend I read a commentary by PC Magazine&amp;rsquo;s &amp;nbsp;editor and Chief Lance Ulanoff &lt;a target="_self" href="http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1895,2164629,00.asp"&gt;&amp;ldquo;Don&amp;rsquo;t Give Google 700Mhz&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;    &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;I posted &amp;nbsp;a &lt;a target="_self" href="http://discuss.pcmag.com/forums/permalink/1004386665/1004386665/ShowThread.aspx#1004386665"&gt;response &lt;/a&gt;at their website and I am still bothered by the position he has taken. &lt;/p&gt;
&lt;blockquote &gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&amp;ldquo; The position that 700Mhz digital data services may require antennas as broadcast analog TV is totally off base.&amp;nbsp; An analog broadcast != &amp;nbsp;(not equal to) digital data, broadcast TV is just that a broadcast signal without any protocol between the receiver and transmitter, whereas digital data receiver and transmitter have defined protocols that optimize reception given the available data rate e.g. WiFi, GPRS etc &amp;hellip;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Some &amp;nbsp;of the biggest advantages of wireless digital data at 700Mhz is not needing line of site , &amp;nbsp;not prone to moisture (water in leaves) and a huge chunk of to be available spectrum. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The position that Verizon, Sprint and ATT know the business and can do better for the American public is &lt;em &gt;weak &lt;/em&gt;at best. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;&lt;a target="_self" href="http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html"&gt;&amp;ldquo;&lt;em &gt;The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is an independent United States government agency, directly responsible to Congress. The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and international communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The FCC's jurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. possessions&lt;/em&gt;.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/a&gt; &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The FCC&amp;rsquo;s job is to manage American spectrum for the country , e.g. the people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;When was the last time Verizon, Sprint and ATT acted on behalf of the people?&amp;nbsp; Checkout your Verizon RZAR and you&amp;rsquo;ll find out they feature lock Motorola&amp;rsquo;s features (like local access to Bluetooth to transfer files), whereas T-mobile does not.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Google is acting to further itself , but there&amp;rsquo;s a difference here.&amp;nbsp; Google&amp;rsquo;s advocacy on Open Access to Spectrum is disruptive &amp;nbsp;&amp;nbsp;and will create innovation in the wireless industry that will benefit the people.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Google&amp;rsquo;s greatest strength is their &amp;nbsp;success, their greatest challenge is maturing as a regulatory influencer against the incumbents who have decades of experience on playing the game.&amp;rdquo;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/blockquote&gt;
                &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;I had to rewrite the post several times just to get my emotions out.&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;Google has and will change the wireless industry.&amp;nbsp; The position they have taken on open access on spectrum will create innovate &amp;nbsp;environment , which will open the markets to more companies that develop hardware, software or services (content).&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;p class="MsoNormal"&gt;The big three will need to be competitive to protect their base, this is no different than the FCC open market position in the 90&amp;rsquo;s that opened local markets which benefited users with more choices and lowered costs.&lt;/p&gt;
</description>
 <pubDate>Mon, 01 Oct 2007 16:26:02 +0000</pubDate>
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